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Governments often use credit projects to foster agricultural 
development, and donors have spent many billions of dollars 
assisting these efforts in low income countries <LICs). Most of 
these projects have been justified by the purported impact loans 
have on ultimate borrowers: e.g., credit needs filled, amounts of 
additional crops produced, changes in modern inputs used, increases 
in borrowere· incomes, and alterations in employment. Almost all 
project evaluations find favorable impacts that, in turn, prompt 
donors and governments to funnel more money into agricultural 
credit. These evaluations have encouraged policymakers to conclude 
that rural financial markets are strengthened by most credit 
projects. 
At the same time, other researchers have evaluated rural 
financial markets in countries with successful credit projects and 
found mounting problems in these systems. They report on markets 
that lose substantial portions of the purchasing power of their loan 
portfolios to ravages of default or inflation, concentrations of 
cheap loans in the hands of the wealthy, political meddling in 
lending, systems that offer few savings opportunities, large 
transactions costs for lenders and borrowers, lenders who are 
addicted to outside funds for their su5tenance, and credit 
institutions that sporadically implode or self destruct <Donald, Von 
Pischke and others). These reports of healthy parts but infirm 
wholes are puzzling. How can large slices of the rural financial 
system that are involved in donor and government projects be doing 
well, while the evstem as a whole is doing poorly? Are these 
projects islands of tranquility in otherwise stormy sess? Or, is 
one of these two approaches to evaluation giving an erroneous 
picture? 
Unfortunately, few credit project evaluations are published in 
journals or books, although a large number of these studies have 
been done. Typically, study results are buried in unpublished 
reports for governments or donor agencies, or in graduate student 
theses. While millions of dollars have been spent on these 
evaluations, relatively little has been said about the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research. Exceptions to this are the useful 
piece by David and Meyer that ·covers problems with quantitative 
methods used in these studies, and the critique by Grewal of credit 
studies done in India. They show that projects have been justified 
in two ways: through ex ante estimates of credit need or credit 
demand, and by ex post evaluations of loan impact on ultimate 
borrowers. 
In the following discussion, I argue that many of these credit 
project evaluations are misleading and do not document the things 
they purport to measure. I also argue that credit-project 
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evaluations address questions that realistically cannot be answered 
and are focusing on the wrong issues. I further argue that most 
loan-demand or credit-impact studies include faulty assumptions and 
methods. I conclude by suggesting that researchers turn project 
evaluations away from borrowers, and focus on how these projects 
affect financial intermediaries and financial marketE. 
~cggit=Qgm§nQ_Ec9i§~~i9na 
Credit-need or demand projections are regularly used to justify 
the amount of funds in a project (e.g. TBAC). This technique is 
sometimeE a subt~rfuge by donors or gcvernmentE to support Epending 
a politically-determined amount of money on rural problems. The 
heter·ogeneity of potential borrowers, and the effect that negative 
real rates of interest and slack loan recovery have on loan demand, 
cripple credit-need studies. If interest rates are negative in real 
terms, as they are in many LICs, and if borrowers steal loans with 
impunity--another common condition--then the demand for agricultural 
loans will be virtually infinite as loans become income transfers. 
The excess demand for negatively priced agricultural loans in 
Brazil during the 1960-?0s, despite gargantuan amounts of formal 
agricultural credit, was a dramatic and costly demonstration of the 
futility of basing credit projects on estimated loan demand <Araujo 
and Meyer>. Recent wholesale defaults in the Philippines, Jamaica, 
the Sudan, and Nigeria are further evidence of the excess demand for 
loans that emerges when lenders and governments are not serious 
about loan recovery <Esguerra, Graham and Pollard, Ahmed, and 
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Adeyemo). Under these circumstances, there is no way of know1ng 
what the effective demand for loans would be if they carr1ed 
positive real prices and were collected. Most credit-need studies 
are a sham and are of little use in designing credit projects that 
boost rather than damage rural development. 
~c§Qit=lm~§£t_§tyqi§§ 
Ex post credit-impact studies attempt to measure the e+fect 
loans have on physical output, on use of various factors of 
production, on borrowers' 1ncomes, or on employment. These studies 
typically compare borrowers' activities before and after thev 
receive loans, or study a sample of borrowers and compare them with 
a control group of non-borrowers. The data used in impact studies 
may come from firm or household surveys, and/or from loan 
applications. 
There are at least three problems with ex post credit-impact 
studies. First, the methods and assumptions used in measuring 
credit impact are suspect. Second, impact studies ignore financial 
savings activities. And third, impact studies usually overlook the 
effects credit projects have on the vitality of the financial 
system. A project may be judged successful on the basis of impact 
studies, yet it may undermine both savings mobilization and the 
ability of the financial intermediary to sustain financial services. 
Almost never are these external costs included in evaluations of 
credit projects. 
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ECQQl§ffi§_~i1n_b§§~ffi2tiQD§_~og_~§ibQQ~ 
Many researchers doing credit-project evaluations assume that 
loans are inputs. This is a serious misconception of what a loan is 
and leads researchers into blind allies. A loan gives the borrower 
additional generalized claims on all goods and services, as does any 
other fungible financ1al instrument. It is a mistake to 1nclude 
loans as a variable in a production function w1th other inputs, as 
some studies reviewed by Grewal have done. It is the physical input 
and not the financial instrument that causes production. Loans only 
facil1tate the acquisition of inputs. At best, thinking of loans as 
inputs is double counting, and at worst it misinterprets the vital 
role financial instruments play in development. It 1s also an error 
to think people gain much from getting a single loan, or even 
several loans; it is far more valuable for individuals to have 
reliable access to a flow of financial services. Said another way, 
borrowers, savers, and financial intermediaries benefit much more 
from a dependable working relationship than from a single financial 
transaction. 
The essential property of financial instruments, their 
f~ngiQi!i~~' introduces additional problems into credit impact 
studies (Von Pischke and Adams). To establish a causal relationship 
between the use of a loan and changes in other activities in a firm 
or household, one must document all sources and uses of liquidity by 
the debtor unit before and after borrowing. One must also be able 
to prove that activities in question would not have taken place 
without the loan--the counterfactual problem. As Meyer and 
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Alicbusan point out, rural firms and households are heterogeneous in 
their sources and uses of liquidity. Further, these units have 
multiple sources of income, various loans, and add to or reduce 
their fixed assets in managing liquidity. Some borrowing un1ts may 
be taking loans, making loans, and saving in financial form at the 
<:::<.mE· time. Because of borrower heterogeneity and fungibilitv. cause 
and effect between leans and changes in other borrowers· econom1c 
actions is difficult to establish. It is very costly to document 
the §~~ltlgn§litY that a loan causes in borrowers' act1vities. 
One hundred percent additionality occurs when a borrower would 
not change a given activity without a loan~ but goes on to use all 
of the loan in that activity. In contrast, zero additionality 
happens when the borrower diverts all additional liquidity provided 
by a loan to activities not specified in the loan document. While 
most credit impact studies assume 100 percent additionality, a large 
measure of diY:§!:§i.QQ and financial §\J.Q&.ti.t~Jti.gn occurs with most 
loans. Financial substitution happens when a borrower receives a 
loan for two sacks of fertilizer, and in fact buys two sacks of 
fertilizer, but would have bought one sack without the loan. That 
is, the loan resulted in 50 percent additionality and 50 percent 
fina.ncial substitution. Half of the loan provided the borrower 
additional liquidity to expand whatever activities she thought to be 
most desirable. If the borrower had planned to buy two sacks of 
fertilizer without the loan, then 100 percent financial substitution 
would have resulted, and the loan would have had no impact on 
fertilizer use, although two sacks of fertilizer were used! 
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Most impact studie~ include questionable assumptions about 100 
percent additionality and zero financial substitution. Zero 
substitution and 100 percent additionality would mean that borrowers 
were not willing to put any of their discretionary liquidity into a 
particular activity in the absence of a loan. For this to occur, 
the activity mu~t be very low on the list of priorities borrowers 
have for expenditures. If a loan results in 100 percent 
additionality lenders have forced borrowers to do something they 
would otherwise completely avoid. In contrast, if one accepts the 
premise that most borrowers are economically rational, then 
additional liquidity provided by a loan will flow to activities that 
are high on the borrower's list of priorities. Since this likely 
occurs with most loans~ a large measure of financial substitution 
must be associated with borrowing. The extent of substitution or 
diversion cannot be documented without collecting prohibitively 
costly information about the borrowing unit's total sources and uses 
of liquidity over time. Case studies can illustrate what happens in 
a handful of units, but the ~eterogeneity of borrowers makes it 
impractical to do enough of these costly studies to represent all 
borrowers. 
Use of control groups introduces additional problems because 
efficient lenders sort those who are creditworthy from those who are 
not. If lending is done carefully it should be extremely difficult 
to assemble control groups that are similar to borrowing groups. 
For example, it would be incorrect to conclude that training by a 
basketball coach caused his players to be tall •. Good coaching 
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sharpens skills, but does net alter height. Players are selected 
because they are exceptionally tall, and no sensible coach would 
claim credit for these attributes--aside from the ability to select 
such people. If lenders do their job properly the clients they 
select will stand taller than the average farmer in terms of farming 
experience and investment opportunities. Loans will help those 
selected to capitalize on their opportunities mere easily, but it is 
likely that those selected would have stood cut as exceptional 
economic performers without leans. When borrower selection is 
involved, it is improper to §t~cibYt§ all of the differences between 
performance of borrowers and non-borrowers to leans (e.g. Daines). 
It is also difficult to sort the lean effect from the effects of 
technical assistance that might accompany the lean (e.g.Begashaw). 
Vogel has argued convincingly that savings mobilization is half 
of the functions a financial market ought to perform. Because 
rural firms and households are heterogeneous, some units will have 
excess liquidity at the same time others have shortages. Informal 
financial markets are unable to intermediate between surplus and 
deficit units that are widely separated. Only a formal financial 
system can do this. As Gonzalez-Vega points out, financial markets 
-that provide attractive savings deposit services allow surplus units 
to avoid investment and consumption alternatives within their own 
units that yield lew returns. The fact that savers voluntarily make 
deposits proves they find the returns on these deposits are more 
attractive than alternative uses of marginal liquidity within their 
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own units. Formal rural financial markets that fail to prov1de 
attractive savings deposit services force surplus units to invest in 
low return activities and/or to consume their surpluses. 
turn, reduces the efficiency of resources use. 
This, in 
How do credit projects affect saving: mobili:ation? Frequently, 
donor or government projects deflect financial intermed1aries from 
seeking or accepting savings deposits. This occurs in three ways: 
First, many projects require that the intermediary lend monev to 
borrowers at concessionary interest rate:: at rates that are below 
those charged on commercial loans, and at rate: that are often lower 
than the expected rate of inflation. Because it is very unwieldy--
even suicidal--to pay rates of interest on savings that are higher 
than those charged on loans, even if the lender receives a subsidy 
to do so, most lenders participating in credit projects pay very low 
rates of interest on savings accounts. Many of these lenders either 
do not offer deposit facilities, or if they do, they make them very 
unattractive for savers to use. 
Another way that credit projects discourage savings mobilization 
is through establishing concessionary rediscount facilities in 
central banks. Typically, these facilities are created to transfer 
project funds from government or donors through the central bank to 
the ultimate lender. In many LICs, numerous rediscount lines in 
central banks are scaffolding left behind by earlier credit 
projects. It is almost a "commandment" for rediscount rates on 
these lines of credit to be concessionary. The rate the ultimate 
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lender is charged is often lower than the rate paid an voluntary 
deposits in most parts of the financial system. Thus~ the ult1mate 
borrower gets large amounts of funds through these facilities at 
rates lower than the already law ratee they must pay their 
depositors. This provides powerful incentives for intermed1aries to 
ignore, and even discourage, depaeit mobilization. Intermeoiar1es 
can hinder savers by imposing substantial depas1t-transaction costs 
on them, by forcing them to maintain large minimum balances, and by 
severely limiting the places where, and times when, thev can make 
deposits or withdrawals. 
The third effect of credit projects on savings mobil1zat1an is 
subtle, yet important. These projects reorient the managers of 
participating intermediaries away from local depositors, as their 
principal client group and primary source of loanable funds, to 
governments and donors. This causes critical changes in manager 
behavior; they treat depositors as pests rather than as valued 
clients, and fawn over donor and government officials while seeking 
outside funds. Since a balanced financial system will always have 
many more depositors than borrowers, this results in a large number 
of rural people being denied access to formal financial services 
they would otherwise use. This reorientation also lowers the 
immunity of the financial intermediary to political intrusions in 
lending decisions, and stimulates an insidious patranal relationship 
between the lender and funding agencies. 
The opportunity costs inflicted on an economy by these three 
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adverse effects of credit projects en savings mcbilizat1cn are never 
lncluded in the economic evaluation of credit projects. 
important and should be considered. 
=§QQ§~-~i~~ilitY 
They are 
Another problem with evaluations of credit projects is thev fail 
to consider how the project affects the vitality of the financial 
intermediary. It would be an error, for example, to ignore in 
calculating the costs of building a dam the roads that were 
destroyed, bridges damaged, and vehicles worn out in transporting 
materials to build the dam. Clearly, the wear and tear on the 
transportation system should be included as part of the dam's costs. 
Likewise, the wear and tear on the financial system should be 
counted when summing the costs of a credit project. Financial 
intermediation is valuable, yet costly, especially when financial 
markets are repressed. Poorly designed projects do extensive--
sometime fatal--damage to participating financial intermediaries. 
Symptoms of injury emerge in growing loan delinquency, high 
transaction costs for participants in financial intermediation, 
turnover in management, the collapse and renaming of lending 
institutions, and loans made to political cronies. Many credit 
projects impose costs en the financial intermediary that exceed the 
additional revenue collected by the lender from the project. Low 
interest rates, inflation, loan default, and negative margins make 
it impossible for .lenders to sustain the real value of their loan 
portfolios without external transfusions. 
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Information from recent studies in several countries illustrate 
how corrosive credit projects can be on the institutions that handle 
them. For example, a recent study by Cuevas and Graham of 
agricultural lending by a government owned bank and a privately 
owned bank in Honduras showed loan transactions costs for lenders 
that far exceeded the 3-4 percent margins allowed the banks on donor 
funds. Even the relatively efficient private bank incurred loan 
transactions costs in handling donor funds that amounted to about 8 
percent of the value of their agricultural loans. Administrative 
costs in the government bank were even higher. These costs were 
above and beyond loan losses due to default, a very substantial 
problem in the government bank. Because of reporting requirements, 
farm budgets~ and targeting attempts, the private bank found that 
its administrative costs per unit of money lent to agriculture out 
of donor funds were nearly five times the costs of lending its own 
money to farmers! Under these circumstances it is clear why the 
government bank was continually seeking more funds from donors or 
government to sustain its lending efforts, and why the private bank 
had tepid interest in continuing to participate in donor sponsored 
lending. 
Research by Ahmed shows similar problems in the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan <ABS>. This bank is very dependent on government and 
credit project money, and pays only 3 percent interest on its 
discounts from the Central Bank. Most of this money is targeted at 
specific agricultural activities or client groups. The ABS is 
limited to charging 7-9 percent per year on loans, even though its 
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administrative casts average from 10 to 15 percent of the value of 
its loans (Ahmed, pp.169-172). These costs do nat include any risk 
premium to cover loan lasses or to compensate the bank for inflation 
that has eroded a major part of the purchasing power of its loan 
portfolio during the past decade. Like its sister institution 1n 
Honduras, ABS experiences serious loan recovery problems. Not anlv 
is ABS inefficient in making loans, but it also imposes high 
transaction costs on its borrowers, even those with whom it has dane 
business far many years. It is not uncommon for borrowers to incur 
loan transactions costs for transportation, lodging, time lost in 
negotiating loans, and for purchase of forms and documents that 
amount to several times their interest payments. 
In real terms the total value of the loan portfolio of ABS is 
less than it was 20 years ago, even though it is the primary 
agricultural lender in the country. The number of bank clients has 
also not increased over the past decade, even though only a small 
percent of the farmers in the country get formal loans. ABS does 
not accept savings deposits and would have to pay the 8-9 percent 
offered on deposits by commercial banks if it were to do so. Ahmed 
reports that at least a few of the ABS branch managers withdraw 
targeted money from the Central Bank at 3 percent, deposit some of 
it in savings accounts at commercial banks at 9 percent, and cover 
part of their administrative costs from the 6 percent arbitrage! 
More comprehensive research in Jamaica shows even more clearly 
how financial intermediaries can be bankrupted by credit projects 
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and associated policies <Bourne). This research highlights two 
large agricultural credit programs carried out by several agencies 
in Jamaica. The first was the Crop Lien Programme that dispensed 
about 22 million Jamaican dollars in alleged agricultural loans from 
1977 to 1979 to a sizable portion of the farmers in Jamaica <Graham 
and Pollard). This project was funded by the Jam•ican Government, 
was aimed at boosting domestic food crop production, was targeted to 
farmers who had no other formal loans, and was administered by the 
Ministry of Agriculture instead of by e~dsting financial 
intermediaries. While the money was quickly disbursed--SO percent 
in the first year--only about 6 percent of the value of the loans 
was ever recovered. <One wonders why those who repaid did so? Does 
this prove that about 6 percent of the rural population is not 
economically rational?>. This program sapped the ability of other 
lenders to recover rural loans, a problem that persists in the mid-
1980s. 
A second activity evaluated was the Self-Supporting Farmers' 
Development Programme CSSFDP> administered by the Jamaican 
Development Bank (JDB>. SSFDP was started in 1969 and was aimed at 
providing supervised credit to operators of small-to-medium sized 
farms <Begashaw, Nyanin). It was jointly funded by the Inter-
American Development Bank and the Jamaican Government through a 
series of credit projects. Over the years several agencies were 
responsible for administering SSFDP, but it ended up in the Jamaican 
Development Bank's hands in 1974. The JDB was only allowed to 
charge 4 percent interest on SSFDP loans up until 1977 when the 
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gove~nment ~aised the ~ate to 7 pe~cent. The JDB was autho~ized to 
cha~ge highe~ ~ates of interest on othe~ pa~ts of its portfolio, but 
it was not allowed to accept deposits. By the late 1970s the SSFDP 
program was reaching only 3-4 percent of the 172,000 small-to-medium 
sized farms in the country. 
Four evaluations of SSFDP (in 1972, 1975, 1977, and 1980) all 
concluded that the program was having a positive impact an 
borrowers' incomes, assets, on-fa~m employment, and on agr1cultural 
output (JDB, SSFDP, and Begashaw). What these project evaluations 
did not analyze, however, were JOB's costs of administering the 
program--which were substantial. In 1980, Nyanin found the 
administrative costs for JDB on SSFDP loans were over 14 percent of 
the loan value. Again, this does not include any provision to cover 
the 10-20 percent default rates that JDB was expe~iencing, nor any 
facto~ to protect the pu~chasing power of loans against inflation. 
If a realistic risk premium, a hedge against inflation, and an 
oppo~tunity cost of funds we~e added to the actual administrative 
costs, the JDB would have had to cha~ge an interest rate well in 
excess of 50 percent to sustain the value of the SSFDP loan 
portfolio. 
While JDB had other p~oblems besides those imposed on it by 
SSFDP, the extra costs it incurred in carrying out this very 
expensive program helped to push the Bank into insolvency in 1981. 
Part of the wreckage of the JDB, along with SSFDP, was cobbled 
together by the government into a new agricultural bank a year later 
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<Graham and ConnollyJ. A capable new manager was ass1gned to tne new 
bank, but he soon resigned because of political intrus1ons. pol1c1es 
that made it impossible to run an efficient bank, and a set of 
activities imposed on the bank that did not pay for themselves. 
Despite the favorable evaluat1ons of the SSFDP program, it is hard 
to see how this proqram strengthened and e:;panded rural f1nanc1al 
services in Jamaica. Inst~ad, SSFDP appears to have contrtbuted to 
financial repression and instabil1ty in the system. 
Why do project officers, policyma~ers, and researchers continue 
to stress credit impact studies and ignore the effect of cred1t 
projects on savings mobil1zation and the v1tality of the lender? In 
large measure it is because of attempts to push development through 
earmarked credit programs: e.g. loans for rice, fertilizer, small 
farmers, land reform participants, and livestock. Setting credit 
targets give policymakers and donors illusions of control. These 
projects are one of the easiest things that politicians can announce 
as a response to pressing problems. In all too many cases, however, 
trying to promote economic activities through these projects is like 
trying to push a cart with a wet rope. Work by Cuevas and Graham 
has shown that loan targeting clogs information channels, 
substantially increases the costs of financial intermediation, and 
reduces the amounts of useful management information flowing through 
the system. Vogel and Larson have also shown that loan targets have 
little to do with loan allocation and production. Loan targeting 
and associated credit impact studies do not improve the performance 
of rural financial markets, rather, they damage it. 
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~§~-~~it§~is 
It is misguided to view credit as an input or attempt to measure 
its impact on those using loans. The results of improved financial 
intermediation on borrowers are too diffused, too subtle, and 
involve too many heterogeneous actors to measure. It is far more 
useful and much les~ co~tly to focus on what a project or policy 
does to the performance of the financial ~ystem. That is, to focus 
on changes in intermediaries' behavior. In doing this, it 1s 
important to remember the role a financial system plays in 
development. It should provide a flQ~ of financial service~ to 
various individuals and firms. These services include loans to a 
few individuals and providing deposit services to a much larger 
number of people. A financial system must be able to sustain the 
quantity and quality of these services over prolonged periods. 
Having reliable access to a financial system that provides sustained 
loan and deposit services of high quality, and working with 
intermediaries who impose only modest transactions costs on the 
users of financial services results in increased efficiency, more 
output, and more savings. Intermediaries are usually not reliable 
unless they cover their costs of operations, recover most of their 
loans, protect or increase the purchasing power of their loan 
portfolios, and innovate to reduce transactions costs. 
Various measures might be used to evaluate financial 
intermediaries, but I feel four criteria are the most useful. The 
first is the number of people who have regular access to formal 
financial services. A rural credit project might be counted 
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successful if it helps to increase the numbers of people who rece1ve 
formal loans and who have savings accounts in rural areas. This 
should include increases in the number of repeat borrowers and 
regular users of deposit services. ~~~~~[iQg_ffiQ~~-gQQ_l~~g~~-~r~9i~ 
~s~ingg_g~gb~_tg_Q§_tb~_msin_fQ~~§_gf_sn~-~~il_9~§tgn~g-~[~9i~ 
Q[Qj~~t· Becoming a regular depositor can be an important way o~ 
building this ratinq. 
A second important measure is the transactions costs involved in 
rural finance. If a project is successful it should stimulate 
banking innovations and economie~ of size and scope that reduce the 
costs of financial transactions in total, and for individual 
borrowers, savers, and intermediaries (Ladman). These transactions 
costs are similar to the friction in a motor. If friction is 
reduced it causes motors to run more smoothly and to last longer. 
Likewise, if transactions costs (per unit of money handled) are 
lowered financial markets work more efficiently and financial 
intermediaries have more longevity. For equity reasons, it will be 
important for intermediaries to adopt innovations that reduce the 
transactions costs for those seeking small loans and making small 
deposits. Also, if a formal financial market is working 
efficiently, the differences between the effective costs of 
borrowing from formal or informal lenders will be reduced over time 
for a given loan and borrower. 
A third measure is changes in the quality of services provided 
by the financial intermediary. ~uality is difficult to measure 
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directly, but loan recovery is an excellent pro~y for it. While 
some loan recovery problems result from the inability to repay, a 
far larger number of borrowers decide to get a divorce from the 
lender because they place a low value on a continued relationsh1p. 
Uncertainty about the availability of additional loans from the 
formal lender, rigid lending procedures, exces51ve paperwor~, 
standing in line, bribes, paying for forms, and being forced to 
visit the formal lender a number of times to transact loans all 
reduce the perceived quality of financial services and also reduce 
the willingness of borrowers to maintain a good credit ratinq. 
Also, borr·owers see little point in staying married to a terminally 
ill intermediary. 
Accurate data on loan recovery by formal lenders are often hard 
to get. If the loan recovery performance is poor, management is 
often casual to devious about assembling data that clearly identify 
the extent of the problem. Bad news about loan recoveries hampers 
attempts to get more external money. Typically, if the formal 
lender does not brag about loan recovery performance in its annual 
report, default problems are serious. Even when lenders formally 
report on loan recoveries, they often present the measure that is 
most favorable to management: e.g. the total amount of loans 
currently overdue divided by the total amount of loans extended 
since the agency began operations! A more revealing measure would 
be the amount of payments collected during a period as a percentage 
of payments due during that period. 
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The fourth measure of performance is the extent to which the 
project stimulates or retards savings mobilization. This might 
include information on increases in number of rural savings 
accounts, changes in the volume of savings mobilized, and changes in 
the ratio of savings-to-loans by financial intermediaries. The 
extent to which increased attention to savings mobilization 
decreases the amount of political intrusions into rural financial 
markets, and how this affects loan recovery also might also be 
considered. 
~QQblg§iQD§ 
It will be impossible to improve the performance of rural 
financial markets in LICs unless their problems are properly 
diagnosed and doctored. Impact studies and credit-demand projection 
are not providing accurate pictures of conditions in these markets. 
Even worse, they are misleading policymakers into thinking that 
progress is being made in improving rural financial services, when 
too often it is not. Instead of trying to measure the impact of 
credit use at the farm level--something that is very difficult and 
costly to do--I suggest that attention be shifted to what is going 
on in firms providing financial services. Evaluators too often 
focus on the egg rather than the goose. The fitness of the goose 
and its ability to lay a number of eggs is the thing that is 
important--not getting a single egg. In too many cases credit 
projects and associated policies give the financial intermediaries 
chronic indigestion and other, sometimes fatal, maladies. It will 
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be impossible to cle~rly understand what is causing financial 
markets to perform badly until more appropriate questions are asked 
and answered about the determinants of their performance. 
In most countries rural financial markets perform poorly for two 
reasons. The first is that farmers receive low and unstable prices 
for their products, and also harvest low and unstable vields. 
Government policies are often to blame for this <e.g. Pollard and 
Graham). Overvalued exchange rates, food price controls. and 
subsidized food imports are wet blankets on farm prices. The lack 
of public investments in support services for agriculture dampenE 
both prices and yields. This depressed economic environment causes 
low incomes, diminished asset values, low yields on investments, and 
reduced savings capacities in rural areas. This, in turn, severely 
limits creditworthiness, loan repayment ability, the quality of loan 
collateral, and savings. Under these circumstances it is nearly 
impossible for an intermediary to achieve economies of size or 
scope, and to innovate. 
The second reason for poor performance is more directly related 
to rural financial markets themselves. Debilitating policies, 
wrongheaded evaluations, and a clutter of well meaning, but damaging 
credit projects, force many rural financial intermediaries to their 
knees. Cheap rediscount facilities at central banks gut the 
incentives that banks and cooperatives have to mobilize rural 
savings deposits. This reorients the managers of these agencies 
away from rural clients to begging additional funds from donors or 
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governments. Political 1ntru~ions, loan targeting, and loan 
recovery problems are the offspring of this alliance. The multitude 
of credit projects imposed on financial intermediaries makes 
financial market~ work less efficiently by increas1ng transaction 
cost. Repressed interest rates make it impossible to mobilize rural 
savings in substantial quantities, and induce lenders to concentrate 
cheap loans in the hands of the wealthy. Until the~e policies c~n 
be swept aside, it will be impossible, even if agricultural profits 
do increase, for rural financial markets in low income countries to 
perform up to their potential. 
23 
Adeyemo, Remi. "Loan Delinquency In Multl-F'Llrpose Un1on in f-:.war.:< 
State, Nigeria." §§~io.g~_§.!J£LQ~~~1..Qld.f!l§.I:\".!;. 8(1984) :.267-274. 
Ahmed, Ahmed Humei da. "Len de!~ Behavior and the F'et-+ormance of Rural 
Financial M.:u-kets in the Sudan." Ph.D thesis, The Ohio State 
University, 1980. 
Araujo, Paulo F. C. de and R1ch61~d L. 1'1eyer. "Agric:ulturc:<.l Cred1t 
Policy In Br-azil: Objectives and Results." Bmgc~-.J.~._gf__t\gr:..!.._!;;£Q0...'!. 
59(1977): 957-961. 
Begashaw, Girma. "Evaluation of a Supervised Credit Project In 
Jamaica. 11 §Q£.!.._§1J.£L!;;£Q0...'!._§:l;.!J£!..:.. 32 < 1983) : 135-169. 
Bourne, Compton. "Structure and Performance of Jamaican Rural 
Financial Markets. " §Q£.:.._e!J£!._§;£QO.:.._§!;l:!f!!.. 32 0983) : 1-21. 
Cuevas, Carlos E. and DoLlglas H. Graham. "AgricultLtral Lending Cost!: 
in Honduras." In !:!o.f!su::mio.io.g_S\:!r:el_E;h.osn£isl_t!sr:!i~t§_~;h.!;b._~b§.§ld. 
~r:~f!;j,_!;. Edited by Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J. D. Von 
Pischke. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp.96-103. 
J:raunes, SamLtel R. "Gua.ternala: l-In t-tnslys1s ot the Impact of Small 
Farmer Credit on Income. Employment and Food ProdL•ctlon." 
Unpublished report prepared by the Div1sion of Sector Analys1s, 
Latin American Bureau, ~gency for International Development. 
Washington D. C., May 1975. 
David. Cristina C., and R1chard L. Me•.ter. "t·lea!:wrlng the Farm Level 
Impact of Agric1-tl tural Loans." In ~QC.!:Qk!'~nL~D!Lb~ru;;!€?r.aLB\J!:el 
Eio.~o.£;!.s!.._t!sr.t~:l;a_~_lora:l;!.:l;y:l;!.Qo.§_io._~§~§!.9P..io.g_b;Q'=ttJ!;c.1.~§· Ed1 ted by 
John Howell. London: Overseas Development In5tltute. 1980, pp. 201-
234. 
Donald, Gordon. bC.§git_tgc._§m~l!.._Esc.~~r::ra_!.n_~~Y~lQQ~D9_~Q!JOtr::t§a· 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. 
Esguerra, Emmanuel F. "An Assessment of the Masagana 99 Credit 
Subsidy As an Equity Measure." E:b!.l~_B§~.!!..-gf_~,!;Q!J~_s.ng_~b!§.!!.. 
18(1981>:168-191. 
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio. 11 Interest Rate Restrictions and the Socially 
Optimum Allocation of Credit." §sY.i0.9l!L~!Jg_~§Y.§!.QQ.ID~Ot 4<1980) :5-28. 
Graham, Douglas H. and Michael Connolly. "The Agricultural Bank of 
Jamaica: Evaluation of Current Performance, Problems and 
Recommendations for the Future." Unpublished report prepared for 
the Agencv for Internat1onal Development 1n Jamaica, May 1984. 
Graha.m, Dougl.i:;;s H. a.nd Stephen ~·: .. Pollard. "The Crop L1en Programme: 
Implications of a Credit Project Transformed into an Ad-hoc Income 
Grewal, Ha.rpal Si noh. "?m Eva.l u.a.ti on o·f Re:earch on !:;.:ural Fi nanci a.l 
Markets in India." Ph.D thesis, Ohio State Univer·sity, 1982. 
Jamaican De'v'elopment Bank. "SSFDP:Socio Economic Eva.lua.tion F:eoort." 
Unpublished reports prepared by the Jamalc5n Development Bank fer 
the Inter-American Development Bank, Kingston, Jamaica,1975, 1977, 
and 1980. 
Ladman, Jerry R. "Loan Transactions Costs, Credit Rationing, and 
Market Structure: The Case of Bolivia." In b!!J.d.§!:ill!.D!.ng_B.!Jt:.:§!:i 
Edited by Dale W Adams, Douglas H. 
Graham, and J. D. Von Pischke. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1984, pp. 104-119. 
Meyer, Richard L. and Adelaida P. Alicbusan. "Farm-Household 
Heterogeneity and Rural Financial Markets" Insights from Thailand." 
In Yn9€cmining_B~c~l_Q€~~1QQID§n~-~;lth_~b€§~_Qc~9;lt. Edited by Dale 
W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J. D. Von Pischke. Boulder Colorado: 
26 
Westview Press, 1984, pp. 22-35. 
Nyanin, Ohene Owusu. "Cost of Agricultural Lending, Institutional 
Viability, and Lender Behavior in Jamaica.'' Ph.D thesis, The Ohio 
State University, 1982. 
Pollard, Stephen K. and Douglas H. Graham. ''The Performance of the 
Food Production Sector in Jamaica, 1962-1979: A Policy Analysis.'' 
g~gQ~_QgyL-~D~-~Yl~L-~b~DQ§· Forthcoming. 
Self Supporting Farmers Development Programme. ''SSFDP: Socia 
Economic Evaluation Report.'' Unpublished report prepared by the 
Self Supporting Farmers Development Programme for the Inter-American 
Development Bank, Kingston, Jamaica, 1972. 
Technical Board for Agricultural Credit <TBAC). Ein§n~tng 
Bgci~Yl~~c~l_Qg~glQQill§Q~~-Ibg_a~tiQD_Ecggc~m- Manila, Philippines, 
Central Bank of the Philippines, 1977. 
Vogel, Robert C. ''Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten Half of Rural 
Finance." In Ung§cmining_flyc§l_Q§~§lg~mgnt_~itb_~h§~Q-~C§git· Edited 
by Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham and J. D. Von Pischke. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 248-265. 
27 
Vogel, Robert C. and Donald W. Larson. "Illusion and Reality 1n 
Allocating Agricultural Credit." In UO~§~mlolog_BY~§l_Q§~§lgamgot 
~itb_G~§~g_gc~~it· Edited by Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham and J. 
D. Von Pischke. Boulder, Colorado: We~tview Press, 1984, pp. 49-64. 
Von Pischke, J. D. and Dale W Adams. "Fungibllitt and the Design and 
Eve.luation o·f Agricultural Cred1t ProJects." E!m~r:~_.J..!.,_gf._flgc..::.._!;G.QIJ...::.. 
62(1980):719-72a. 
Von Pischke. J. D., Dale W Adams and Gordon Donald. B~r:~l-Elo~o~i~l 
tlsc1~ta_lo_Qgy~lgelog_Qg~otcl~a~-I~§lc_~a§_sn9_Bqy§§· Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 

